
Revolutionary Politics

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Mehran Kamrava

PRAEGER

Westport, Connecticut
London

settings. As with other historical events, the developments and causes that bring revolutions about need to be examined and analyzed within the specific national and historical contexts which they occur. Cultural and national nuances are indeed important in influencing the direction of historical events, revolutions included, as are indeed the role of human agency and individual initiative. The framework laid out here does not overlook such unique characteristics and, in fact, takes into account the variations that may result from specific traits not found elsewhere. The aim here is not detailed historiography or intricate sociological analysis but rather to pinpoint certain trends and developments that occur before, during, and after revolutions. Toward this goal, chapter two examines the social and political conditions that prevail prior to revolutions and the ways in which those developments in turn determine the nature and overall character of the revolutionary process.

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Causes and Processes

The forces that lead to the appearance of revolutions and revolutionary movements are engendered in evolving political structures and in social and cultural arrangements and dynamics. More specifically, particular characteristics within pre-revolutionary states, coupled with the broad, contextual ramifications of social change and the dynamics inherent in political cultures, combine to give rise to conditions conducive to the outbreak of revolutions. However, despite the widespread prevalence of such conditions, revolutions have become decidedly rare occurrences, even in Third World countries, where the social and political prerequisites of revolutions abound. Why, it is thus important to ask, have revolutions not taken place with their supposed frequency given the existence of their social and political requisites? Moreover, exactly how and what social and political dynamics lead to revolutions and at which specific junctures? It is to these questions which the present chapter turns.

Broadly, revolutions denote rapid and fundamental changes in political arrangements and leaders, principles and orientations.¹ They entail the transformation of the very political fabric on which a government is based. Palace coups and changes in leadership and in personalities do not necessarily constitute a "revolution" in the fullest sense, despite what the coups's protagonists often like to think, although it is quite conceivable that a coup may set in motion a chain of events that could lead to the outbreak of a revolutionary situation.

Revolutions are much more fundamental developments. They turn the world of politics around, change the basic premises on which political culture is based, and transform the guidelines and the intricacies by which political conduct is governed. In this respect, revolutions are distinctively political episodes, although their precise occurrence is brought on by a coalescence of not only political but also social and cultural factors as well.² As past and recent experiences have demonstrated, to say that revolutions are "political struggles of great intensity"³ and that they invariably entail considerable violence⁴ has become somewhat of a truism, although the 1980s did bear witness to the budding of "negotiated revolutions" in some parts of Eastern Europe.⁵ Yet by and large revolutions still remain mass-based affairs of great magnitude, brought on and carried through by the mobilization of masses of people against specific political targets. Even Hungary's largely "negotiated revolution" was precipitated and in turn fueled by the vocal protestations of mobilized Hungarians in Budapest and in other cities.⁶

It follows that any credible attempt to explain revolutions needs to consider the conditions under which mass mobilization is achieved.⁷ This includes an analysis of the prevailing *social* as well as the *political* conditions that are conducive to such mass mobilization. Revolutions are *political* episodes to the extent that they denote the crumbling of an old political order and its replacement by new political objects, arrangements, and structures. Exactly *how* this collapse and the subsequent replacement are brought about are manifestations of not only political dynamics but also that of all those other factors, social and cultural, which also influence mass mobilization and political activism. Thus to see revolutions as only political events is to grasp only half of the picture. Political dynamics need to be considered in conjunction with social and cultural developments.

It is within this type of a multi-disciplinary framework that theories of revolutionary causation need to be constructed and put forth. Ancient and contemporary scholarship bears witness to ceaseless and at times highly impressive efforts to examine the root causes of revolutions and to grasp the full extent of the social and political dynamics which result in revolutionary episodes.⁸ Theories of revolutionary causation and

consequences abound in the social sciences literature, some of which have had far greater explanatory success than others.

Nevertheless, these theoretical explicandums for the most part suffer from a number of highly significant analytical deficiencies.⁹ To begin with, most existing theories ignore the inherently varied nature of revolutions and attempt to explain such diverse phenomena in one, all-embracing framework. What results are theories which in their attempt to find applicability to *all* revolutions become at best too generalized.¹⁰ The need for specificity is both historical and contextual. Revolutions vary from one another according to the different historical contexts within which they occur.¹¹ Thus a theoretical framework which explains the causes of, say, the French Revolution may not necessarily apply to more contemporary examples.

Yet the necessity of historical specificity in a theory of revolutions pales in comparison to the importance of its attention to the significant role that human agency plays, which is by nature reflexive and changeable. A theory of revolution needs to consider the intrinsic changeability that is imparted to revolutions because of human initiative.¹² More than anything else, the actual success or failure of revolutions depend on the specific actions taken by revolutionary participants, actions which are inherently varied according to the context, the timing, and the manner of their execution.¹³ The decisions which revolutionary leaders make, the manner in which those decisions are implemented and pursued, and the specific consequences that may arise from them differ from one case to another. It is precisely these vital details that make each revolution different. Even in cases where deliberate attempts are made to emulate previous models, as, for example, Che Guevara tried in Bolivia, the striking differences in the detailed mechanisms by which revolutions are carried forward become plainly clear. It is precisely this lack of attention to contextual specificity, at the heart of which is the variable nature of human conduct and initiative, that has led to the demise of so many emulative revolutionary movements around the world.¹⁴

In addition to their overly ambitious and thus highly generalized nature, most theories of revolution put too much emphasis on one aspect of revolutionary eruption at the expense of other, equally significant ones. Among the theories of

revolution which in recent years have gained widespread respect and currency within the academic community, emphasis has been placed either on the "dissynchronization" of value systems and the ensuing "disequilibrium" of pre-revolutionary societies;¹⁵ on the inability of social actors to fulfill their wants and aspirations;¹⁶ on the regime's incapacity to absorb emerging groups into itself¹⁷ or to mobilize them to its own benefit;¹⁸ or on the state's inability to withstand the pressures brought on it by structural weaknesses and by class-based revolts.¹⁹ In virtually all of these approaches, overwhelming emphasis is placed on one facet of social and/or political developments while the simultaneous contribution of other dynamics are undermined or completely ignored.²⁰ In a few instances, emerging developments have forced a revision of earlier, one-faceted theories.²¹

But the tendency to give primacy to one aspect of analytical examination while underestimating the importance of others still pervades current scholarship on revolutions. Within this broad analytical framework, the dynamics that result in the appearance of revolutionary circumstances are political as well as social. Politically, the outbreak of revolutions require a significant weakening of the powers of political incumbents and their growing incapacity to hold on to the state's powers and its various other resources. These include loss of control of the means of economic hegemony over the general population, discontinued control over not only the coercive organs of the state, such as the army and the police, but also over the regime's propaganda networks such as the electronic and print media, and a steady loss of privileged access to socially valued goods and institutions. In general, the primary precondition of revolution is the loss of previously-held powers and privileges on the part of the elite. This reduction in the elite's powers may be caused by any number of domestic or international developments which could adversely affect the powers of the state. Internationally, such a weakening could occur through inter-state disputes and military conflicts, or excessive diplomatic pressures or conditional relations.²² Internally, the elite's hold on power may be weakened by such events as the demise of a central, authoritarian personality, or excessive and naked competition over power resources.

Concurrently, however, the political exigencies thus created need to be exploited by the efforts of groups who take specific acts

in order to bring about the regime's collapse. Unless and until such groups exist, and acquire powers sufficient to overwhelm those of the dying regime, a revolution will not occur. In essence, revolutions are raw power struggles of the highest order: on the one hand exist the political elite, in control of the state, their powers and privileges steadily declining due to a variety of internal and/or international developments; on the other hand there are revolutionaries, increasingly belligerent and with more specific demands, gradually achieving enough size and strength to overpower and replace the elite.

These political dynamics cannot occur in a social vacuum. The growing momentum of the contenders of power, who are gradually seen as--and who come to see themselves as--revolutionaries, and the withering of the state, both take place within and, in fact are precipitated by, social and cultural dynamics. Social developments help in the structural weakening of the state in a number of ways. Most fundamentally, social change and industrial development lead to the creation of various social classes and values which the existing system cannot absorb into itself.²³ Thus, especially in modernizing societies, where new classes are continuously emerging and where old and new values are in constant flux, the state assumes an essentially conflictual relationship with emerging social groups and seeks constantly to sever their access to sources of political power. Regardless of the eventual outcome of this state-society conflict, even if society has been subdued and subjected to the state's full control, the very existence of such an adversarial nexus weakens the basic foundations of the regime and increases the likelihood of its collapse.

A more important contribution that social dynamics make to revolutionary outbreaks is in augmenting the extent of popular support enjoyed by revolutionaries among the general population. By their very attempts to communicate with the masses and to get their increasingly revolutionary message across, emerging revolutionary groups employ various social medians, some of which they may not even be aware of. The existence of a number of social and cultural factors can either significantly enhance or curtail the legitimacy of political contestants and influence their respective longevity and political viability. Depending on the specific conditions within a given society, apathy, and

conservatism may drown a revolutionary group into oblivion, with its cries of injustice and calls to revolt falling on ears deafened by passivity and content. Yet at the same time, social conditions may invoke in people not only a sense of injustice and deprivation, but also nationalist and religious sentiments which make them highly amenable to revolutionary mobilization. The prevalence of specific social conditions that lead to revolutionary action, and the exact nature of the link between the existing conditions and the types of responses evoked, are context-specific and vary from society to society. What is clear is that social conditions do in fact influence revolutions, more specifically revolutionary mobilization and action, in highly significant and far-reaching ways.

In analysing the causes, the course, and the outcome of revolutions, a multi-disciplinary approach of the type laid out above finds particular applicability. Politically, revolutions often take place in systems that are not highly evolved and have not reached a particularly notable degree of institutional and organizational differentiation. Within this context, contemporary, twentieth-century revolutions invariably occur in the comparatively underdeveloped political systems of the Third World, particularly those that embody "praetorian" characteristics.²⁴ Even the so-called "classic" revolutions that occurred prior to the classification of the "Third World" as such--those in France and in Russia, to name two examples--evolved in political atmospheres that are not unlike the ones existing in today's pre-revolutionary, praetorian, Third World polities. In praetorian systems, social and political forces confront each other nakedly, in their most brute form, seeking aggressively to implant themselves and to supplant others. This polarization is further accentuated by the fragility of norms that govern political conduct, underwrite social relationships, and support existing institutions.²⁵ Within this context, while the state-society links are more tenuous, their relationship with each other is a much more consequential one. In the Third World particularly, changes occurring in the state can far more dramatically affect society than is the case in the West. Adversely, changes taking place in Third World societies can have far more dramatic political ramifications than they would in Western countries. Examining revolutions thus requires

detailed analysis of political dynamics that lead to the state's weakness and to the emergence of its avowedly revolutionary foes, in addition to the development of social and cultural conditions conducive to popular revolutionary mobilization. State breakdown is only one facet of revolution. The social and cultural milieu within which it occurs is just as important.

STATE BREAKDOWN

Revolutions are brought about through a confluence of political developments and social dynamics which weaken the powers of governing incumbents and at the same time augment the capabilities of those aspiring to replace them. The political dynamics at work involve the incumbents's loss of legitimacy, the growing weakness and vulnerability of the structures and the organizations they have at their disposal, and the concurrent activities of revolutionary groups aimed at exploiting these emerging exigencies and the resulting mobilization of masses toward revolutionary goals. Equally significant are the prevailing social and cultural conditions that are conducive to revolutionary mobilization, be they a general sense of deprivation among various social strata or disenchantment over emerging social values. Also important are the means of access which revolutionary groups have to the general population, determined in turn by either existing social organizations or by alternative nexes that are specifically forged for this purpose.

It is only through a concurrent appearance of all of these dynamics, from legitimacy crisis and structural breakdown to revolutionary activism and socially and politically conducted mass mobilization, that a political revolution in the fullest sense takes place. Otherwise, in instances where emerging political weaknesses and vulnerabilities are not exploited by revolutionary groups, or when self-proclaimed revolutionaries operate in a social vacuum and seek to overthrow a strong and viable state, what occurs is merely political instability and upheaval but not revolution. It is important also to distinguish between a revolution and a palace coup, the latter resulting merely in a change of personalities while the former denotes an all-encompassing change in political arrangements, institutions,

and practices. Coup leaders all too often proclaim themselves revolutionaries and declare their reign to be the start of a revolutionary era. It was indeed a military coup that brought the Ethiopian revolution to a head and dawned the post-Haile Sellassie era.²⁶ However, the Ethiopian example has not been widely repeated, and the vast majority of military coups, especially in Latin America and Africa, result in a change of political personalities rather than principles. Politicians are only actors in the political drama. Their replacement with other actors does not necessarily affect the outcome of the play. It is the institutions which they create and which they in turn occupy, and the ideologies and principles which they espouse, that constitute the political drama itself and affect society at large. Revolutions involve changing not only political actors but the entire scenario on which the drama of politics is based.

With this in mind, it is important to remember that the key to all successful revolutions, the catalyst that sets into motion all of the other dynamics which produce revolutionary circumstances, is the political incapacitation of the ruling elite. Revolutions are in the first order developments that result from the political crises that engulf those in power. This centrality of state power arises out of the state's control over the various prized resources in society. Especially in the Third World, the state not only has power over the army, the police, and the bureaucracy, it also controls, directly or indirectly, various aspects of economic life, including resources, services, and general economic activity. In short, the state controls most if not all of the essential tools and resources that are necessary for the running of the country. Unless and until this control is somehow weakened and is in turn transferred over to centers outside of the state, then aspiring revolutionaries will not find sufficient resources with which to mount and to maintain a political takeover.

The political weakening of pre-revolutionary states can be caused by the appearance of three broad categories of developments. Most directly consequential in bringing about revolutionary situations, and by far the most common set of developments weakening state power, are those with direct negative bearings on the state's cohesion and organizational viability. These are developments which lead directly to the structural collapse of state organizations and institutions.

Developments as diverse as wars, economic bankruptcy, or the death of a central figure in a personalized system, are among those category of events which can dramatically reduce the state's continued ability to control the resources needed to stay in power. Similar consequences may arise from partial and incomplete processes of political modernization, thus leading to overstretched bureaucracies incapable of dealing with evolving circumstances, unfulfilled demands for increased political participation, and a general absence of society-wide political entrepreneurship. Lastly, there is the development of a situation best described as a "crisis of legitimacy," engulfing political leaders and hence reducing their ability to rule and to stay in power.

Legitimacy Crisis, Structural Collapse

These developments are not mutually exclusive and in fact often occur in connection with one another. The relationship between crises of legitimacy and structural collapse is an especially strong one. In fact, these two developments are naturally interrelated and reinforce one another. This relationship of mutual reinforcement assumes particular importance in Third World countries, where the very process of development can create crises of legitimacy for political incumbents. Questioning the legitimacy of political leaders is an inevitable ramification of the intertwined processes of industrial growth, social change, and political development. The development syndrome results in a widening of perceptions on the part of ever larger numbers of people and, therefore, an increase in sensitivities about possible alternative ways of doing things in all phases of life.²⁷ What occurs is a "dissynchronization" between the values that political leaders hold on the one hand and those of the general population on the other.²⁸ More specifically, crises of political legitimacy arise when the claims of current leaders to power are based on socially unacceptable historical or ideological interpretations, when the degree of political socialization has not been sufficient to convince the people of the legitimacy of existing political arrangements, and when there is excessive and uninstitutionalized competition for power.²⁹ In essence, a legitimacy crisis arises out of inadequate

and incomplete political institutionalization, itself an endemic mark of Third World political systems.³⁰ Thus a structural analysis of the collapse of pre-revolutionary states must necessarily examine legitimacy crises that concurrently accompany them.

Legitimacy crisis is basically a crisis of authority. It signifies the inability of political leaders to justify their continued hold on power.³¹ As mentioned earlier, legitimacy crisis is inherent to the process of development. However, a number of specific dynamics exacerbate the withdrawal of the proverbial "mandate of heaven" and heighten a regime's sense of illegitimacy among the population at certain historical junctures. The problem is one of inability to deliver the goods promised or in demand, be they economic, political, or emotional.³² Lack of dynamic leadership and political acumen, continued and persistent demands for greater political participation or increased economic gratification, or a neglect or abuse of sources with symbolic importance, such as religion and nationalism, can all significantly accentuate popular perceptions about a regime's illegitimate claims to power and unfitness to govern.

Structural weaknesses in turn augment the potency of legitimacy crises by compounding the difficulties faced by supposedly incompetent leaders, and by giving added purchase to people's negative feelings about the regime. Moreover, the sense of illegitimacy that prompts people to demonstrate their displeasure with political leaders has important consequences for mass mobilization, when prevailing circumstances allow. Here again, the relationship between structural variables and legitimacy crisis is crucial in pushing revolutions.

Within the plethora of social and political developments that bring to a head the eruption of legitimacy crisis, the role of political leadership is central. This centrality arises from the fact that it is the legitimacy of political leaders that is at the very heart of legitimacy crisis. This propensity toward a sense of illegitimacy in leadership is even stronger in countries subject to intense social change, where, through diffusion or imitation, the populace is constantly striving to attain political liberties prevalent elsewhere. Again, the distinct characteristics that contemporary Third World systems have make them especially susceptible to revolutionary eruptions, particularly in comparison

to the political systems of the West. In varying degrees, Third World leaders need constantly to react to, or at least to justify not abiding by, the standards which underlie the Western world because their populations are inclined to criticize, albeit often implicitly, the basis of political authority based on such foreign standards.³³

Authoritarianism and Revolution

It is no accident that revolutions have historically taken place in decidedly antidemocratic, authoritarian states.³⁴ Within the specific context of the Third World, exclusionary regimes, which do not bother to mobilize popular support in order to justify their narrowly-based sources of authority, are seen as particularly illegitimate and are most vulnerable to the outbreak of revolutions.³⁵ Such regimes are often based on the rule of a single, all-powerful political figure and have an increasingly narrow base of support.³⁶ The blatant corruption of the elite that is frequently endemic to these regimes, their tight control over education and the press, the control of the economy by a few families, and their frequent neglect of national interests in preference over the interests of the superpowers, all combine to significantly increase the likelihood that such polities fall victim to crises of legitimacy.³⁷ Nevertheless, even these brittle political systems can stave off revolutions if they acquire the patronage of a sufficiently strong segment of the population, especially the middle classes.³⁸

Yet the relationship between political leaders and legitimacy crisis extends to more than the mere maintenance of popularly-acceptable political practices and interpretations. Political leaders can significantly enhance or harm their popular legitimacy depending on how they treat the various symbols which are held in high value by important social classes. Most notably, the political leaders's neglect or offensive treatment of nationalist values and sentiments, historical traditions and cherished cultural values, and religious beliefs and symbols can dramatically reduce their legitimacy. In order to bring the prevailing social and cultural principles in concert with their political doctrines and ideologies, political leaders often interpret socially pervasive symbols in a manner that would fit

their narrow purposes, regardless of how twisted or even offensive those interpretations may be. Interpretations ascribed to specific historical episodes and to religious values, in particular, are used extensively in augmenting the legitimacy of existing political institutions and practices.³⁹

Manifestations of nationalism play an even bigger part in accentuating the popular sense of illegitimacy ascribed to political leaders in developing countries.⁴⁰ Colonial or neocolonial relations generate the most potent sense of nationalism and are most conducive to legitimacy crises for colonial powers or their local proxies. Other forms of less-dependent relationships are also instrumental in bringing into question the legitimacy of existing elites by heightening a perception of their subservience to foreign powers.⁴¹ Yet the linkage between legitimacy crisis and nationalism is more than one of political sensitivity. Nationalist sentiments can be offended through the appearance of economic and industrial subservience to a foreign country. A group of elites may effectively cultivate a sense of political nationalism and in fact exploit it to their benefit. However, the economic policies that they pursue, especially if their strategy of economic development is one of import-industrialization substitution,⁴² can give rise to sentiments of economic nationalism and discredit their legitimacy as genuinely national leaders. Similarly, intense propagation of Western values and norms by governing elites and ensuing backlashes among social classes can have similar effects.

The Economic Roots of Revolution

In addition to demands for greater political participation and the upholding of values with symbolic importance, crises of legitimacy can arise out of a government's inability to meet evolving economic demands and expectations. The inability to "deliver the goods," politically and emotionally, represent only two of the shortcomings that lead to legitimacy crisis. A government's inability to deliver more tangible goods, those which directly affect the economic well-being of the population, can have even more direct bearing on its perception as legitimate or illegitimate. Similar to antidemocratic, authoritarian states, those countries that are in a comparatively disadvantageous

economic position are more prone to revolutions.⁴³ Not unlike growing demands for greater political participation, often arising out of diffusion of or exposure to Western political practices, the transitional nature of economic development breeds rising expectations, thus accentuating the legitimacy crisis of those regimes unable to meet such expectations.⁴⁴ In instances where "there is the continued, unimpeded opportunity to satisfy new needs, new hopes, new expectations," the legitimacy of political leaders is greatly enhanced and the probability of a revolutionary outbreak is reduced to a minimum.⁴⁵ When there is widespread economic deprivation, however, whether actual or perceived, real or relative, the likelihood of opposition to a regime is significantly increased, especially when that regime is seen as an obstacle to continued economic mobility.⁴⁶

Lastly, the sources and the means through which a sense of the illegitimacy of political leaders is instilled and popularized among the people is important. A general feeling of unacceptability regarding the political and ideological justifications of political incumbents may already exist among a population. But how are these negative sentiments given sufficient potency and direction to be usefully channelled into revolutionary agitation? The issue is not merely one of overt revolutionary mobilization. Before large-scale mass mobilization toward avowedly revolutionary goals can be achieved, and even before the social and cultural conditions conducive to mass mobilization can appear in a society, there must be voices of dissent, no matter how faint and silent, bringing to light the illegitimate premises on which the current leaders's rule is based.

Legitimacy crisis is based on the perception that current political values and practices are not legitimate whereas some other alternatives are. It is more than coincidental that almost all legitimacy crises that proceed revolutions occur along with a general "intellectual rebelliousness," a "foment of ideas" which sharply criticize the status quo and propose ideological and valuatave alternatives. The proliferation of intellectual activities that occurred before the revolutions in France,⁴⁷ Russia,⁴⁸ Cuba,⁴⁹ Iran,⁵⁰ and Hungary,⁵¹ to mention a few, all had the affect of heightening popular perceptions of illegitimacy attributed to incumbent regimes. All too often, these sudden

outbursts of intellectual activism are scattered, unorganized, and uncoordinated, without a coherent doctrine or theoretical framework emerging until sometime later. In France, for example, there was little agreement before 1789 among the many *philosophes* and *physiocrats* who were theorizing about various political concepts.⁵² Russia's pre-revolutionary "foment of ideas" in the 1910s was expressed mostly through a highly amorphous literary movement. In Cuba what occurred was not a coordinated attempt to formulate a new theory but essentially "a guerrilla war of concepts, objectives, and abstractions."⁵³ And in Iran the evolution of "political Islam" as an alternative frame of ideological reference was only piecemeal and gradual.⁵⁴ Yet the cumulative effects of these alternative values and conceptual frameworks in undermining the legitimacy of political incumbents is undeniable.

Precisely why the flourishing of intellectual activity, which is part of the process of legitimacy crisis, occurs before revolutions is related to both social and to political dynamics. On the one hand, the characteristics that are inherent in the political cultures of praetorian systems, coupled with the intense processes of social change that they undergo, breed an environment which is conducive to the appearance of intellectuals propagating comparatively revolutionary ideas and concepts. In societies where merely speaking one's mind or even satirical writings are considered "revolutionary," any meaningful steps toward commentary and analytical writing can have a magnified social and political affect. At the same time, on the other hand, the structural weaknesses that engulf pre-revolutionary states add a special significance to the works of intellectuals and other men of letter. Even if purely artistic in value, works done by intellectuals in such an atmosphere add to the overall sense of skepticism regarding the legitimacy of the current order in general and that of the political establishment in specific.

The growing sense of unease with the legitimacy of the body politic is further compounded by the structural breakdown of the political system itself. A group of politicians who are unable to deliver the political, social, and emotional goods that are in demand are considered as being even less justified in their rule when the very organizations through which they govern start to

break apart. Again, the contextual relationship between legitimacy crises and structural weaknesses assumes crucial importance. Revolutions, as mentioned earlier, are in large part a product of the breakup of the political establishment. Only after the state has already lost a substantial part of its coercive abilities due to various debilitating developments, such as military defeats or bureaucratic collapse, have revolutionary groups found an opportunity to carry forward their agendas and to gain widespread popular support.⁵⁵ Reinforcing and in fact expediting this breakup is the popular perception of political elites as unfit to rule and unjust in holding onto the reins of power.

In analyzing the structural breakup of pre-revolutionary regimes, equal attention needs to be paid to international as to domestic factors. With the growing complexity of evolving national agendas and international circumstances, economic and even political interdependence between modern nation-states has become an inseparable part of contemporary comparative politics. "Every modern state," John Dunn writes, "if it is to be understood accurately, must be seen just as fundamentally as a unit in an international system of other states as it must as a key factor in the production of social and economic power within its own territorial purview."⁵⁶ Consequently, the types of developments and relations one needs to analyze within pre-revolutionary states are not merely those between the pre-revolutionary state and society but also those between the state itself and other states.⁵⁷ Specifically, it is important to see what negative ramifications arise from a state's inability to meet the challenges of evolving international circumstances as, for example, the French, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and more recently, the governments of Eastern European countries experienced.⁵⁸

A variety of domestic developments have the potential of causing the paralysis of pre-revolutionary states and subsequently expediting the appearance of revolutionary movements. Such developments occur fundamentally within the purview of the state's organizations and its structures. Specifically, in relation to Third World or other praetorian systems, the breakdown of state structures assumes particular importance due to the peculiar manner in which an overwhelming majority of such structures have evolved. Third World countries

are inundated with states that have variously been labelled as praetorian, "neo-patrimonial," or "Sultanistic."⁵⁹ For reasons discussed below, the structures supporting these states are particularly brittle and unreformable and are thus prone to being subsumed by revolutionary movements. Such regimes are inherently weak, for they cannot substantially penetrate their respective societies regardless of their cumbrous bureaucracies, or the fear and awe they instill in their populations through their armies and secret police. The fragile and often compulsory bonds that link the state to society are easily broken when the very seams that hold the state together begin to disintegrate, and the social energy released through this breakage often has devastating revolutionary consequences. It is not widespread poverty and misery but rather this endemic fragility of state institutions, and in turn their inability to control and to penetrate civil society, that is the most prevalent cause of revolutions.⁶⁰

Praetorian systems are particularly susceptible to revolutions because they tend to breed an atmosphere that politicizes grievances that are otherwise nonpolitical. Those who are excluded from the political process and are not recipients of its patronage are especially likely to blame the political system for shortcomings that may or may not be politically related, such as economic difficulties or sudden social and cultural changes that cause widespread disillusionment and resentment. Particularly in closed, authoritarian systems, political leaders are seen as the primary protectors of the social and economic good, the all-embracing force from whom all power emanates. Eager to ascribe to themselves all benefits accrued through their rule, they are similarly blamed through popular eyes for discomforts that may not necessarily be of their doing. Precisely because of this overwhelming role played in all affairs of the country, or at least due to popular perceptions of such predominance, these elites represent highly visible and resented symbols of authority, targets that are not only easily identifiable but also serve to unify protestors with different grievances and from diverse backgrounds.⁶¹ Also important is the tendency of such regimes to valorize political opposition and, by virtue of their repressive characters, to turn even moderate opposition into radical revolutionism.

Unlike personalized political systems, military

dictatorships and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes are not as readily susceptible to revolutions, although they are inherently just as unstable politically. The accentuated instability of personalized systems as opposed to bureaucratic or military dictatorships arises out of both structural characteristics as well as the functional attributes of the different systems. Structurally, the varying roles of the armed forces and the police in different systems are central to the extent of their political survivability. In all three types of political systems, repressive organs such as the military and the police play a pervasive part in maintaining the status quo. In fact, coercive organizations in such systems tend to be the most sophisticated and organizationally viable of the institutions.⁶² Nevertheless, in military dictatorships and in authoritarian bureaucracies, the police and the army are often more capable of supporting the political order in times of crisis and turmoil than they are in personalized systems. This discrepancy in the effectiveness of coercive organizations in maintaining the status quo arises out of the different structural relationships that they have with the various governing bodies. In bureaucratic and military dictatorships, the army and the police are often the very organizations that occupy the seat of power and themselves form the governing elite. Even if not directly part of the establishment themselves, the relationship between these organizations and the ruling elite is at a much more intimate level than is the case in personalized systems. There is thus a lot more at stake for them in ensuring the survival of the political order than it might be in different circumstances.

Moreover, dictators in personalized systems often govern through creating and then manipulating cleavages between various organizations, even within various factions of the army, and are highly dependent on the loyalties they forge through patronage and manipulation.⁶³ They are thus constantly on guard against possible conspiracies, or at least a waning of loyalties, loyalties that frequently wear thinner as crises set in.

International Factors

Domestic developments are, nevertheless, only one category of events that bring about the structural collapse of an existing state. International factors can be as equally potent determinants

of the viability of domestic structures and organizations. The prevalence of unequal economic and political relationships between Third World governments and the more powerful Western countries only compounds the sensitivities of domestic Third World political institutions to changes in the international environment. The extent of domestic structural responsiveness to international fluctuations varies according to the degree of economic and political dependence.

In overtly dependent Third World countries, several factors make the domestic power structure particularly brittle and exposed to revolutionary situations. To begin with, the over-identification of the elite with one or more foreign powers substantially increases their sense of illegitimacy in the public eye and makes it difficult for them to justify their rule on historical and nationalist grounds. More specifically, dependence on a foreign power reduces the political maneuverability of incumbent elites and circumscribes the range of their potential responses in times of crisis.⁶⁴ For the elite, the conduct of domestic politics becomes diplomatically conditional: domestic responses rely heavily on the diplomatic nuances of the more powerful state.⁶⁵ Thus incumbent regimes in Iran, in the Philippines, and in Hungary felt compelled, for one reason or another, to pursue domestic policies that were being explicitly or implicitly advocated by their stronger patrons.⁶⁶ Whether actual or perceived, these regimes felt pressured by international constraints from pursuing policies which they otherwise might have pursued in order to remain in power.

In instances of outright colonial domination, ruling colonial structures are not necessarily any less prone to revolutions as are weaker, dependent states. Similar to personalized and bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, direct colonial rule often disperses economic and political privileges to very few elite groups, often to settlers, and thus generates considerable anger and resentment especially among the middle and upper classes.⁶⁷ As if the granting of special privileges on the basis of racial characteristics, often the case in colonies, is not a sufficient precondition for widespread animosity toward the colonial establishment, nationalist sentiments and demands for political self-government further fan the flames of anti-colonial revolutions.⁶⁸ Furthermore, again similar to personalized

regimes, colonial administrations are both highly visible targets for economic and political frustrations as well as unifying elements which draw together groups with diverse social, economic, and ethnic backgrounds whose unity would not have been so easily achieved otherwise.⁶⁹

The external relations that can potentially lead to revolutions need not necessarily be of the type found between patron and client states. The outbreak of revolutionary circumstances in one country may lead to similar developments in another through imitation, instigation, or even contagion.⁷⁰ Insecure about the extent of their newly-acquired powers and paranoid about the conspiratorial designs of outside forces, revolutionary regimes often try to foment revolutions in neighboring countries in order to enhance their own legitimacy and power-base both at home and abroad. Similarly, domestic revolutionaries, for lack of indigenous role models or an ideology of their own, often idolize revolutionary heroes in other countries and try to follow their teachings and replicate their actions. Fueled by such revolutionary myths as Latin American continentalism, Arab unity, and Pan-Africanism, the "echo effect" of revolutions is amplified by the verbal inflation of what is usually no more than a handful of guerrillas.⁷¹ Also prevalent are the contagious effects of revolution in one country on events occurring in another, a development further fueled by the unrelenting propaganda of most revolutionary states and the tendency to imitate foreign revolutionaries. As the changes in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and their reverberations in the rest of Eastern Europe demonstrate, also important are the cumulative effects of gradual changes in world-historical contexts. These accumulated developments often give rise to "slow, secular trends in demography, technology, economics, religion, and worldly beliefs that set the stage for the rise and decline of core hegemonic orders, which in turn create opportunities for peripheral and small groups to gather situational advantage and revolt."⁷²

In so far as dependent regimes are concerned, relations with a more powerful foreign patron can have either negative consequences for the viability of domestic structures or, as the case might be, a reinforcing, positive effect. For decades, for example, the overwhelming diplomatic force of the Soviet Union, backed

up with military might under the Brezhnev doctrine, kept together the seams of Eastern European regimes and repeatedly suppressed emerging revolutions such as the one in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the 1960s, the Kennedy administration's policy of "Alliance for Progress" was similarly designed to contain the embryonic emergence of revolutionary circumstances on the Latin American continent.⁷³ This policy of containment was once again pursued with great zeal in the 1980s under the auspices of what came to be known as the "Reagan Doctrine." In speech after speech, President Reagan warned of "a mounting danger in Central America that threatens the security of the United States" and spoke of the necessity to contain it.⁷⁴ "Using Nicaragua as a base," he declared

the Soviets and Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there, they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean seaways and ultimately move against Mexico.⁷⁵

The pursuit of a foreign policy thus shaped in turn resulted in heightened American economic, diplomatic, and even military presence throughout Latin America, from Mexico down to Grenada, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. In one way or another, whether militarily or through economic aid, American efforts in Latin America were designed to strengthen incumbent regimes and to stem the tide of revolutions threatening the governments of the region.⁷⁶

Incomplete Political Modernization

In addition to crises of legitimacy and to domestic and international sources of structural weakness, states can lose a substantial degree of their cohesion and organizational viability due to incomplete and partial processes of political modernization. Thorough and complete political modernization involves the progressive rationalization and secularization of authority, the growing differentiation of new political functions and specialized structures, and increased participation in the political process.⁷⁷ In almost all Third World countries, however,

there has been a persistent reluctance on the part of existing centers of power to undergo growing secular rationalization and to open the system to unsolicited and undirected political participation.⁷⁸ The negative ramifications of skewed political modernization thus figure particularly prominently in Third World polities, where centralized political structures strive to pursue parallel but contradictory goals of increased consolidation and accommodative participation. Political modernization is, in fact, inherently politically destabilizing as it undermines loyalty to traditional authority, creates a need for new loyalties and identifications, and increases the public's desire for wider participation in the political process.⁷⁹

When demands for greater participation are not met, the accentuation of unfulfilled aspirations substantially increases the likelihood of political instability.⁸⁰ The absence of any meaningful means and institutions through which political objectives and demands for participation could be channelled only aggravate the inherent fragility of the system.⁸¹ Even those groups which gain entry into politics do so without becoming identified with established political institutions or acquiescing in existing political procedures.⁸² Under repressive regimes, where political demands cannot be comprehensively formulated, much less expressed, the result is a further polarization of the inherently antagonistic relationship that exists between the state and society.⁸³ Moreover, partial political modernization further hampers the cohesion of the political system and impedes the growth of political entrepreneurship and national integration.⁸⁴ The political context remains hopelessly unevolved, exacerbating the rawness and nakedness with which political forces and dynamics confront each other. Such a persistent absence of "normative regulations of the means of competition," as one observer has put it, results in heightened political instability and a growing proclivity toward revolutionary eruption.⁸⁵

In addition to structural attributes, functional characteristics are equally important in determining the longevity of various political systems. Personalized systems are comprised of highly visible, widely feared and resented, manipulative political figures whose longevity is determined by their vigilance, political will, and sheer wiliness. Patrimonialism pervades and

there is a predominance of inter-elite and inter-organizational rivalries manipulated by the person of the ruler.⁸⁶ Bureaucratic and military dictatorships, along with other types of corporatist regimes,⁸⁷ are, however, more likely to extend patronage to the various social groups and try to incorporate them into the system.⁸⁸ The vulnerability of such regimes to widespread, mass-based revolts is thus reduced, at least so long as the extension of patronage continue uninterrupted and the popular goods in demand, political and otherwise, are delivered.

REVOLUTIONARY MASS MOBILIZATION

The political dynamics that bring about revolutionary circumstances are by no means limited to the structural breakdown of pre-revolutionary states. Equally important are the deliberate efforts of avowed revolutionaries in bringing down the existing political order, as well as the situational possibilities for such groups to achieve the widespread support and mobilization of the masses. Revolutions, it must be remembered, are as much products of human initiative as they are the result of the political and structural demise of incumbent elites.⁸⁹ The existence of oppositional groups with the specific purpose of exploiting the state's evolving difficulties is an integral part of any full-blown revolution.⁹⁰ What varies from one historical example to another is the exact timing of the formation of such groups. Some revolutionaries predate the start of the regime's structural difficulties, while others begin to collect into cohesive organisations *after* the regime's atrophy has begun.⁹¹ The crucial difference, especially insofar the starting point and the nature of revolutionary activism are concerned, is that some revolutions are *planned*, signified by the premeditated actions of revolutionaries based on previous calculations, whereas others are more *spontaneous*. Planned revolutions are typically formulated and carried out by revolutionary organizations which, due to the force of circumstances, rely on guerrilla warfare in overthrowing existing regimes. Thus the revolutions in Vietnam, China, Cuba, Algeria, and Nicaragua were all planned revolutions.⁹² Spontaneous revolutions, on the other hand, acquire their leaders only after the revolutions are well underway. The revolutions in

France, Russia, Iran, and the ones sweeping across Eastern Europe in the late 1980s were all of the spontaneous variety. In all instances, nevertheless, the active initiatives of groups aiming to compound and to exploit the political difficulties of regimes is essential in bringing revolutions into fruition. Otherwise, what results are weakened states, lingering and in disarray, but unopposed and unchallenged.

Spontaneous Versus Planned Revolutions

Spontaneous and planned revolutions differ most significantly in the manner in which the revolutionary mobilization of the masses is achieved and in the role of the revolution's leadership cadre. In both types of revolutions, the paramount weakness and vulnerability of existing political institutions are necessary preconditions. In planned revolutions, however, a clear, identifiable cadre of revolutionary leaders exist who seek to expedite the regime's collapse through their activities. In the process, they hope, their stature and legitimacy with the public will increase, enabling them to augment their popular support and following. Such groups are actively revolutionary, both in name and in their goals, and seek specifically to bring about revolutionary circumstances. They in fact proclaim themselves to be revolutionaries long before actual revolutionary circumstances set in. In spontaneous revolutions, on the other hand, leaders of revolution ascend to that position gradually and only through the progression of revolutionary circumstances instead of the other way around. In planned revolutions, revolutionary leaders expedite the appearance of revolutionary situations. In spontaneous revolutions, it is through the progression of revolutionary developments that its ultimate leaders are determined.

In planned revolutions, the role and initiatives of professional revolutionaries are of highly important. These revolutionaries do not necessarily "make" revolutions by themselves, but are instrumental in mobilizing, organizing, and arming revolutionary masses.⁹³ Their specific purpose is to compound the structural deficiencies of the regime by turning the political frustrations of the masses into organized revolutionary action.⁹⁴ In their efforts, self-proclaimed revolutionary leaders

recruit an army of their own and wage a war aimed at overwhelming the state. They have two pressing concerns: the formation of an army that would at least be comparable in strength to that of the regime; and the strategic and tactical maneuvers of this revolutionary army aimed at bringing about the regime's military defeat. It is only through a successful combination of these two tasks that a revolutionary organization can succeed in overthrowing the state.⁹⁵ For reasons discussed below, the leadership cadre of this revolutionary army is frequently drawn from the ranks of the urban middle class, while the rank and file foot soldiers, the majority of the troops, are made up of rural inhabitants and peasants.

The efforts of revolutionary leaders in mobilizing and directing peasant activism require more than anything else a solid and viable organizational apparatus. In addition to an aroused and mobilizable peasantry, guerrilla revolutions require a disciplined army and a party organization that can provide the coordination and tactical vision necessary for peasant unity and ultimately for control of national power.⁹⁶ Peasant-based revolutions depend directly upon the mobilization of peasants by revolutionary organizations, making the sheer availability and effectiveness of such groups a necessary precondition of revolutionary situations.⁹⁷ Often times, spontaneous political acts by peasants has forced a scramble for the mobilization and formation of their would-be leadership.⁹⁸ The degree of interaction between peasants and the leadership, and the extent to which leaders can absorb the peasantry into their organization and to expand their power base, determine the viability and success of the revolutionary movement. Absence of firm links between revolutionary leaders and followers, especially in guerrilla revolutions where planned revolutionary initiatives play an extremely important role, can substantially reduce a movement's chances of success.⁹⁹ Moreover, for guerrilla organizations to succeed in achieving their revolutionary goals, they need to have a sustained ability to recruit new members, structurally and organizationally evolve and develop, and to endure the adversities of military confrontation with the regime.¹⁰⁰

The social composition of the leadership of peasant-based revolutionary movements is often decidedly non-rural. It is, in

fact, frequently the disaffected members of the middle classes, most notably urban-educated students and intellectuals, that occupy most of the leadership positions of guerrilla organizations. Disjointed processes of social, political, and economic development turn the middle classes (especially in the Third World) into inherently revolutionary groups, groups whose oppositional inclinations are likely to rise along with their level of education and social awareness. Given their greater sensitivity to their surrounding environment, the most revolutionary of groups are often middle-class intellectuals, and the most revolutionary of intellectuals are students.¹⁰¹ These are dissatisfied literary elites who have turned into professional revolutionaries. They have entrusted themselves with the task of establishing solid revolutionary coalitions and alliances which can not only overcome social, ethnic, and economic divides but which are also capable of eventually replacing the current regime.¹⁰² In search of an audience willing to follow and to obey them, they most frequently find the peasantry.

The Peasant as Guerrilla

The preponderant role of the peasantry in guerrilla organizations arises out of a combination of rural conditions that are conducive to oppositional mobilization, as well as the political and ideological inclinations of revolutionary leaders themselves. To begin with, urban-based political activists are drawn to the peasantry by a number of practical political considerations. Frequently, a lack of political penetration by the government machinery into distant towns and villages has resulted in the alienation of the countryside from civil society. Despite detailed and large-scale control over various aspects of urban life, most praetorian governments, particularly those in the Third World, pay at best scant attention to the countryside and for the most part neglect not only the economic development of rural areas but, what is politically more important, their political mobilization or at least pacification as well. Even in instances where concerted efforts aimed at the political mobilization of rural inhabitants have been launched, large numbers of peasants continue to remain outside the influence of what often times turn out to be only halfhearted campaigns. The

political vacuum thus created offers potential guerrilla leaders ample opportunity for recruitment and mobilization. In an environment of little or no official political presence of any kind, guerrilla leaders can not only recruit followers with relative ease but can also conduct revolutionary acts which, even if only symbolically important, may have a magnified effect. For guerrilla organizations, mere survival can be politically as important as it is to win battles. In the eminently political types of wars they wage, survival for the guerrillas is a victory in itself.¹⁰³

Another reason for the attraction of revolutionary leaders to the peasantry is the supposed "ideological purity" of peasants brought on by their geographic and political distance from centers of power. Alienation from civil society also entails ideological and valuative estrangement from the political establishment. Mao, who was perhaps the most astute observer of the peasantry's revolutionary potential, went so far as to label peasants (not the Communist Party) as "the vanguards of revolution," "blank masses" uncorrupted by the bourgeois ideologies of the city.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, not only is the peasantry ideologically unassimilated into the political establishment, its predicaments and objective conditions often closely match the revolutionaries's ideologies. Most revolutionaries declare their aims to be the alleviation of misery and injustice, poverty and exploitation, the very conditions which in one way or another pervade most rural areas. Coupled with greater possibilities for recruitment and mobilization, ideological compatibility with objective conditions draws most leaders of planned revolutions to remote rural regions and areas. There is thus a strong connection between the revolutionaries's ideology and dogma, and circumstances prevailing in the countryside.

The development of the actual links that bond revolutionary leaders and guerrilla organizations to the mass of peasants are important in determining the extent and effectiveness of revolutionary mobilization. The establishment of such nexes and the resulting mobilization are dependent upon several variables, some indigenous to local conditions and others dependent on the characteristics of the guerrilla leaders themselves. Chief among these determining factors are the degree of the hegemony of the local ruling classes, the nature and extent of rural coalitions and

alliances, and the ability of guerrilla leaders to deliver the goods and services which others cannot. In most rural regions, pre-capitalist peasant small-holders, sharecroppers, and tenants are likely to enjoy cultural and social (as well as organizational) autonomy from ruling elites, despite their tendency toward localism and traditionalism.¹⁰⁵ This relative, built-in resistance to elite hegemony and consequently receptivity to ideological and organisational alternatives arises out of a sense of economic security and independence, as inflated as it may be, *vis-a-vis* the more dominant rural classes such as big landlords and estate owners. The spread of capitalism and the subsequent commercialization of agrarian society is also important in bringing about peasant rebelliousness.¹⁰⁶ This increasing propensity toward revolutionism is not necessarily because of the increased exploitation of peasants due to the spread of capitalist relations, but, rather, is derived from a general breakdown of "prior social commitments" to kin and neighbors and thus greater flexibility and independence to act as desired.¹⁰⁷ Even more important, however, is the extent of direct government control over a region, or indirectly through landed proprietors acting as government proxies. Favorable political circumstances, most important of which are the existence of weak states, are crucial in determining the feasibility of revolutionary activism and possibilities for peasant mobilization.¹⁰⁸

Another significant factor which determines the success of guerrilla leaders in mobilizing peasants in their support is the guerrillas's ability to deliver goods and services, both actual and perceived. People will join or abstain from opposition groups based on the rewards they receive, both individually or as a collective whole, rewards that may be emotional as well as material.¹⁰⁹ Specifically, in relation to rural areas, revolutionary movements have won broad support when they have been willing and able to provide state-like goods and services to their targeted constituents. The establishment of "liberated areas" secure from government attacks, the provision of services such as public education, health care, and law and order, and the initiation of economic reforms in the form of land redistribution or tax reductions are particularly effective measures in drawing peasants closer to guerrilla leaders.¹¹⁰ The success of revolutionary groups in peasant mobilization becomes

even more tangible when they provide local goods and services with immediate payoffs before attempting to mobilize the population for the more difficult task of overthrowing the government.¹¹¹

The provision of goods and services may not necessarily be material. For most peasants and rural inhabitants, participation in an army-like guerrilla organization offers a way of escaping from disillusioning surroundings and finding purpose and meaning in a greater cause. Membership in an organization becomes an end in itself, a mean to fulfill desires of assertiveness and beliefs in higher goals and principles. To command and in turn to be commanded, to hold a gun in hand, and to aspire to dreams and ideals are often mechanisms through which peasant revolutionaries, especially younger ones, try to shatter their socially-prescribed, second-class image and, in their own world, attempt to "become somebody."

Social Polarization and Spontaneous Revolution

While planned revolutions frequently take the form of organized, peasant-based guerrilla attacks on specific targets, spontaneous revolutions are more elusive in their start and in their objectives, especially in their earlier stages, and tend to be centered more in urban as opposed to rural areas. Spontaneous revolutions typically begin with a drastic decline in the coercive powers of the state, followed in turn by a simplification of the political process and the subsequent growth of polarization among various segments of society.¹¹² Political simplification and polarization are interrelated: the growing dichotomy of society into two crude and simplified camps of political supporters and opponents polarizes the political environment and leads to the politicization of traditionally nonpolitical groups.¹¹³ Crisis-initiating events, exacerbating responses by the regime, and the increasing weakness of the elite in the face of the revolutionaries's growing momentum all combine to bring about a revolution.¹¹⁴ In this sequence of events, political mobilization takes place outside of the state's purview and in fact it occurs precisely because the state itself was unwilling or unable to sanction popular political participation. Precipitating events force the hands of those claiming the revolution's leadership

mantle, prompting them to be more reactive rather than initiative in their maneuvers. These emerging leaders exploit rather than create the situational opportunities that arise as the revolution progresses.

Clearly, to minimize the role and importance of revolutionary leaders and their actions in spontaneous revolutions would result in a gross misunderstanding of the revolutionary process. The role of leaders in spontaneous revolutions increases as the course of events progress and as the revolution's features and goals become clearer. Leaders of spontaneous revolutions do in fact call the shots, but only after it becomes clear that they are indeed the ones commanding the adherence of the masses in the streets. How these leaders achieve their exalted position *vis-a-vis* the protesting masses depends on a number of developments. Most notably, they include a coalesce of their organizational and verbal skills, the cultural communicability of their revolutionary message and ideology, and their effectiveness in exploiting the opportunities presented them by the regime's collapse. Also important are the viability of the social and/or political organizations through which they establish their links with the larger society and relay their beliefs and propaganda to their ever-growing mass of followers.

It is here that the crucial role of social organizations in spontaneous revolutions becomes evident. Focus must be on the groups and classes that comprise a society's strata, the various groups that seek to overthrow the state by mobilizing popular support, and the connections that are forged or which already exist between the social classes on the one hand and the opposition groups on the other. In planned revolutions, the links between revolutionary leaders and the masses are established through the political parties that have been established for this very purpose. The ideology, structure, and initiatives of these parties are designed in a manner not only to capture political power but also to acquire popular support as a necessary starting point. In contrast, in spontaneous revolutions avowedly revolutionary organizations initially play only a marginal role and operate on fringes of the larger social and political setting. In fact, as exemplified in one historical case after another, the revolutionary organizations that evolve under the eventual leaders of spontaneous revolutions are at best highly amorphous

and rather unstructured.¹¹⁵ It is instead through existing social organizations that the necessary links between revolutionary leaders and the masses are established. Before having even acquired the support and sympathy of the population, the revolution's leaders are determined by virtue of their dominant position within society and by the strength of the social institutions they have at their disposal.

The Informality of Spontaneous Revolution Leadership

Whereas the success of planned revolutions greatly depend on the viability of the political parties and organizations involved, it is mostly through highly fluid, non-formal, and society-wide institutions and means of communication that the leaders of spontaneous revolutions communicate with their emerging followers and push the revolution forward. Gatherings in churches, tea-houses, community meeting places, social or ritualistic ceremonies, and other occasions in which intense interpersonal interactions at the local level are conducted can all serve as instruments through which messages and instructions can flow from revolutionary organizers to street protestors. The access various revolutionary groups have to these instruments of communication and mobilization determine which ones can call on the most followers more effectively, enabling them to eventually assume the leadership of a mounting revolutionary movement. Other factors significant in the nexus between the leaders and followers thus established include, among others, the depth and social salience of the informal and society-wide institutions involved, the sheer numerical size and popular availability of these organizations, and their degree of immunity from government reprisals. Equally important are the ideological and strategic compatibility of these social organizations with those of the opposition groups. While priests and religious activists may fully exploit the advantages of churches and other religious institutions in communicating with the masses, for instance, communist activists, most of whom reject religious aesthetics on doctrinal grounds, are likely to shun their use and thus circumscribe the scope of their mobilization efforts.

It is these differing roles of social organizations as opposed to revolutionary parties that has led to a historical paucity of

spontaneous revolutions in most contemporary Third World countries. Examples of planned revolutions spearheaded by guerrilla organizations, or at least intended revolutions, inundate Third World countries, especially those in Latin America.¹¹⁶ Planned revolutions occur most frequently where relatively strong (often military-based) regimes coexist side by side with bifurcated societies plagued by social, cultural, economic, and ethnic divisions. In such settings, revolutions could not possibly take place if not for the deliberate efforts of revolutionary organizations. Spontaneous revolutions, however, require strong social organizations and comparatively homogeneous societies, characteristics that are not readily found in many Third World countries. As it happens, throughout the Third World the most viable social organizations that have not been fully absorbed into the state are religious institutions, especially those with a history of political independence. It is primarily due to this reason that in non-Western countries where spontaneous revolutions have taken place, as in Iran and in Eastern European states, that religious institutions have played such vital parts in the revolutionary movement.¹¹⁷ Politically independent social organisations, of which religious institutions have been prime historical examples, have afforded emerging leaders of revolutions access to the popular classes, both in terms of communication and organization, and have thence enabled them to popularize their beliefs and propagate their revolutionary actions among the population at large.

Ideology and Revolution

A final feature that separates spontaneous and planned revolutions is the role of ideology. Ideology plays a much greater role in planned revolutions than it does in spontaneous ones. By nature, planned revolutions are far more dependent on the deliberate revolutionary mobilization of the masses than are spontaneous revolutions, in which state breakdown and mass opposition activity largely occur spontaneously and with little encouragement from designated leaders. As such, ideologies form an intrinsically more important part of planned as opposed to spontaneous revolutions. Planned revolutions, brought on by the efforts of guerrilla organizations, are often guided by strict

interpretations of specific ideologies. They are, in essence, as much ideological movements as they are revolutions.

Spontaneous revolutions, however, initially lack ideological specificity, especially in their embryonic stages when revolutionary leaders have not yet been fully determined. Leaders of planned revolutions know exactly what they want, that is, to wrest political power away from the ruling class, and have clear targets and objectives. In their pursuit, they develop or adopt an ideology most suited to their ends. In furthering their cause and efforts, the adoption of an ideology by guerrilla leaders is particularly important in representing an alternative frame of reference to that of the regime. Since they do not hold power, revolutionary leaders must convince their audience that what they believe in holds greater promise than what the regime has done. A revolutionary ideology is needed, therefore, to further the legitimacy of the revolutionaries and to delegitimize the views and beliefs of those in power.¹¹⁸ In spontaneous revolutions, on the other hand, the ideology of the revolution becomes clear only with the emergence of its cadre of leaders. Most spontaneous revolutions are, in fact, free of any specific ideological characters until well after the ultimate winners of the revolution have become clear and have established their reign over the country. During the course of the revolution itself, differing ideologies are as much in competition with each other as are various opposition groups who find themselves at the helm of a brewing revolution. For protesting crowds, and for the emerging leaders of the revolution themselves, an ideological understanding of the revolutionary movement is summed up in dogmatic slogans promising vague ideals and rejecting the present. Specific doctrines with detailed outlines for future courses of action are conspicuously absent, at least until after one revolutionary group has completely dominated the movement. Even then, the ideological character of many post-revolutionary states become clear well after their initial establishment. Post-revolutionary ideological orientations often emerge out of strategic, diplomatic, and organizational considerations which may not necessarily be the ones that the revolutionaries originally held.¹¹⁹

Considering that spontaneous revolutions start out as non-ideological movements, the existence of precise factors and conditions that specifically facilitate mass mobilization assume

particular importance. A regime's popular social base among those it governs, its ability and willingness to use coercion to quell the expression of anti-state sentiments, and the degree to which the popular classes are allied together against the governing elite all determine the extent and depth to which a population is spontaneously mobilized against a political order. A most important factor is the extent to which various social classes have been coopted into the regime and identify with it both politically and valuatively. It is precisely those groups unincorporated into the system, often unidentified and alien from it, that are most amenable to anti-state persuasions.¹²⁰ They have very little or nothing at stake in the prevailing political arrangements, and indeed frequently view them as a source of misery and grief. Given the existence of favorable social and political circumstances, such as a permissive political environment and a general willingness to revolt, these groups waste little time in showing their displeasure over the state of affairs. These expression of anti-state sentiments by one group are greatly strengthened when joined by those of other groups, enhancing the size and forcefulness of an emerging alliance united in its dislike of the prevailing polity. An alliance of the middle classes, who in the Third World are most prone to political opposition, and other, less well-placed social groups like the peasantry or the proletariat is particularly threatening to the political order.¹²¹ Such a coalition not only enjoys the raw social and economic powers that stem from middle class participation, it also has the numerical strength and size of the lower classes, who, not having a whole lot to lose anyway, are more prone to taking risks and partaking in acts of political violence.

Non-Political Factors

Also influential in shaping the depth and the nature of anti-state mobilization are a number of otherwise politically unimportant logistical factors. Variables that in one way or another affect popular conduct, such as the weather, availability of recreational facilities, transportation routes, and opportunities for fact-to-face communication all influence the extent of mobilization and the manner in which it comes about and is conducted.¹²² Expressly political factors are equally important.

The mere existence of anti-state grievances and sentiments is not sufficient for mass mobilization.¹²³ The political space provided by the state and by the efforts of existing or emerging revolutionaries are equally important. The extent to which the state is willing and capable of using coercion to maintain its power contributes most directly to the nature of opposition mobilization. Often, pre-revolutionary states lack the strong willpower necessary to withstand the onslaught of an evolving revolution, wavering among different options and unwilling to bear the costs of heavy-handed repression. In other instances, where expressions of opposition are met by determined responses, only sympathizers are intimidated into silence and become passively obedient. For the most part, activists are not discouraged but are rather radicalized, and the political atmosphere is more polarized than stabilized.¹²⁴

The breadth of mass mobilization is in turn determined by the existence of specific society-wide conditions which are conducive to revolutionary developments. Several developments, not all of which are specifically political in origin and in context, arise within the larger society which make various social strata prone to revolutionary mobilization and, concurrently, have the potential of further exacerbating the regime's political difficulties. In a broad sense, these developments provide the contextual background within which the widespread mobilization of emerging revolutionaries is made feasible and takes place. More determinedly, the ramifications of these developments or at times their mere existence often serve as the main impetus for popular opposition against ruling elites, manifestations of which are made possible by permissive prevailing political circumstances. People will not revolt against a regime unless there is a compelling reason for them to do so.¹²⁵

Political incapacitation by incumbent regimes simply provides the space and the breathing room necessary for the articulation and expression of political antagonisms. It is not, however, by itself a sufficient *cause* for the coordinated expression of anti-establishment sentiments by a reasonably large segment of the population. The specific sentiments and grievances that prompt populations into political activism *may be* political, but they may just as likely be nonpolitical, at least in genesis if not in actual form of expression. What is needed is a thorough

examination and understanding of the underpinning characteristics and features, both political and otherwise, of societies in which revolutionary mobilization takes place. Then an identification can be made of those factors and dynamics which, individually or in conjunction with one another, invite an otherwise inert mass of people to demonstrate their collective displeasure when political circumstances allow.

Three specific sets of developments in any society have the potential of leading to the mobilization of large numbers of people. They are, broadly, those developments that give rise to economically-based grievances, to social and cultural grievances, and to political grievances. In their own way, each of these developments produce feelings of resentment and opposition against those who are popularly perceived as responsible for society's ills. Feelings of economic unease and grievance can potentially arise out of the many consequences of industrial development and technological modernization, such as scarcity of essential goods resulting from demographic growth, feelings of deprivation and inequality *vis-a-vis* others, and class structures conducive to antagonistic behavior. Social and cultural grievances, meanwhile, become most acutely pronounced during periods of intense social change, particularly when prevailing social values become disjointed and clash with one another. Lastly, political grievances, which are both frequent and which form an integral part of almost all revolutionary movements, arise out of such developments as alienation and desires for wider participation in the political process, nationalism, and growth of alternative ideologies.

Various facets of economic development substantially increase the potential, in one way or another, of widespread protests among the different social classes. The precise causal connections between economic development and political instability and violence are blurred and varied at best.¹²⁶ Nevertheless, under specific circumstances, development invokes certain reactions among people that can have potentially politically threatening results. On the most elementary level, industrialization expands the numerical size of some economic classes at the expense of others: rural inhabitants, most notably the peasants, find their numbers increasingly dwindling while the industrial and the middle classes often rise steadily.

Propertyless and unemployed villagers mushroom into a proletariat, and domestic migration becomes an uncontrolled, integral part of the development process.¹²⁷ Depending on specific economic policies, traditionally-based elites and upper classes are also often weakened, both politically and economically, and are replaced by newly emerging elite groups. In most Third World countries, it is thus not uncommon to find long-established landed or commercial elites and aristocratic families gradually fade into political oblivion and give way to new groups who owe their status to modern economic relations such as banking, international trade, and modern industries.

How these consequences of industrial development and economic growth on class composition affects the stability of political elites varies from one specific instant to another. Nevertheless, shifting class structures can and in fact often do influence the viability of a political system, particularly in cases where the state is dependent on and in turn patronizes a specific class. The close political and economic affinity of numerous praetorian regimes with one or more of the elite classes has frequently been one of the main sources of dissent and grievance by both the public at large and by emerging or existing revolutionary groups.

Another potential source of economic grievance that can increase the public's propensity toward revolutionary action is a feeling of economic deprivation. This syndrome is not unrelated to the development process and is, in fact, most accentuated in countries undergoing rapid economic growth and modernization. Modernization brings with it new needs, outlooks, and desires. It engenders new hopes and fosters rising expectations. Those who experience continued increase in well-being develop expectations about continued improvement.¹²⁸ "The crucial factor" in the promotion of society-wide economic grievances

is the vague or specific fear that ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost. This fear does not generate if there is continued opportunity to satisfy continually emerging needs; it generates when the existing government suppresses or is blamed for suppressing such opportunity.¹²⁹

What occurs is a sense of economic deprivation, one that is relative to either one's past, to future aspirations, or to lesser capabilities than before but higher aspiration for the future.¹³⁰ People who feel deprived and are frustrated in their goals and aspirations have an "innate disposition to do violence to its source," which, especially in the Third World, is perceived to be the government.¹³¹ In instances when the sources of deprivation are obscure and cannot be attributed to specific political targets, alternative doctrines and ideologies which justify violence gain increasing currency and appear as more and more plausible to ever-growing segments of population.¹³²

Also related to the general process of development and more specifically to feelings of deprivation are growing rates of inequality among various classes. Economic inequality by itself does not necessarily lead to political violence and the relationship between the two developments is context-specific.¹³³ In accented forms, however, inequality, whatever its causes, leads to a reduction of identification between the rulers and the ruled. In the face of continued misery and little or no identification between the body politic and the rest of society, widespread expressions of political discontent become highly likely.¹³⁴ In countries entangled in the complicated and multifaceted web of industrial development, a variety of factors can potentially heighten existing economic inequalities and create new ones. Unequal access to economically valuable goods due to social or political influence, especially those goods whose value rises along with the pace of industrialization, exacerbate differences in class standing, power, and prestige. The spread of commercialism across social and class lines polarizes competition over valued goods, especially those that are often in scarce supply, such as arable land and water. In instances where normative means of competition are lacking and there are permissive class structures and political circumstances, the potential for political violence is greatly magnified.

Economic inequality can also arise from demographic growth, albeit indirectly, which similarly increases the scarcity of prized resources both in urban and in rural areas, particularly in the latter. Although the connection between the two developments is not universal, under certain circumstances population growth severely strains state capabilities and can

bring it to the brink of collapse, as was the case immediately prior to the English revolution.¹³⁵ Reduction of state revenues and irregularities in finances, elite competition and turnover, and other negative ramifications that can arise out of population growth may in one way or another propel a weakened state toward breakdown.¹³⁶ The connections among population growth, inequality, and revolutionary action is even more direct. "Given a finite set of resources, a bifurcation process takes place in which many persons have very little and a few persons have much. This process has been shown to occur in instances of mass revolution."¹³⁷ In fact, those revolutions that have involved the extensive mobilization of peasants have taken place in countries where there has been a scarcity of land and its concentration in strikingly few hands.¹³⁸

The last category of economic grievances which can potentially lead to revolutionary mobilization stem from the predominance of particular class structures. These class-based mobilizational dynamics may or may not necessarily be exacerbated by the industrialization process. The prevalence of specific structures and patterns of intra- and interrelations within each class can significantly determine their potential for revolutionary mobilization. The middle and the lower classes, including the peasantry, are most directly amenable to grievances arising out of class structures and relations. As discussed earlier, the primary source of grievance among the middle classes is the frustration of their aspirations and feelings of relative deprivation.

Insofar as peasants and other rural inhabitants are concerned, their revolutionary mobilization is most feasible when the peasant community as a whole is strong and they enjoy some sort of economic and political autonomy, and when landlords or proxies of the establishment lack direct economic and political control at the local level.¹³⁹ Peasants with small holdings are normally conservative and quiescent, reluctant to risk losing their paltry goods and heavily dependent on rich peasants and landed upper classes.¹⁴⁰ Sharecroppers and propertyless laborers, who have little to lose and much to gain by risking the adversities of violent action, along with middle-income peasants frustrated by their inability to break into the ranks of large estate proprietors, are most apt to partake in revolutionary action. An equally inert

conservatism similarly pervades over the upper echelons of the industrial working class, especially among highly skilled technical workers who form part of a "labor aristocracy."¹⁴¹ Having finally secured stable and relatively comfortable positions, skilled industrial labourers are less willing to engage in the risky and often violent political activities in which the proletariat readily participate.

Despite their extremely important role, economic grievances are not the only category of dynamics that are conducive to mass mobilization. Society-wide grievances with deep roots among the population can arise out of the appearance of certain social and cultural factors as well. The many and varied ramifications of social change are examples of the developments that can propel an otherwise quiescent group of people into revolutionary mobilization. Socially-aroused political opposition is often attributed to an absence of "harmony" between a "society's values and the realities with which it must deal."¹⁴² Disparities between the way people feel and behave and their surrounding environment may indeed lead to their disillusionment and the subsequent focusing of their anger on political targets. But, at least insofar as Third World countries are concerned, social antagonisms are more likely to arise out of an incoherence of the very values that people hold and cherish. Specifically, deeply-felt feelings of trauma and anguish are likely to occur when the prevailing values of society themselves are sharply divided, incoherent, and at times outright contradictory. Social and cultural homogeneity is hardly evident in any contemporary modern society. In some societies, however, especially those undergoing rapid modernization and development, values are so disjointed and contradictory that valuative heterogeneity turns into what are almost completely separate and unrelated clusters of different cultures. When sufficient numbers of people ascribe to these differing value systems, and they all demand equal shares of the available cultural and political resources, then there is potential for violent action, especially if normative means of political competition are nonexistent.

Yet the mutual incompatibility of desired and cherished values may not even transcend across social and class lines. People, especially citizens of Third World countries, who are constantly bombarded with ever-changing norms and values, can

become disillusioned within themselves and in turn vent their anger on political objects. They become torn between the values that they have traditionally come to adopt and cherish and those contradictory ones which they either feel compelled to adopt or willingly desire.¹⁴³ The greater the intensity of the conflict among prevailing social values, the greater is the extent of individual and collective disillusionment, and thus the higher the probability of politically threatening behavior. Similarly, the more acutely aware of the conflict between the values to be adopted, the more disillusioned the average citizen feels and thus the greater likelihood of his or her political activism. That is primarily why in countries undergoing change and growth, students and intellectuals, whose job it is to examine prevailing social values, are more prone to political opposition than are other groups.¹⁴⁴

Political Causes of Mass Mobilization

Lastly, a series of developments can give rise to politically-originated grievances. Because those grievances that are derived from social and economic developments are expressed in political terms, it is frequently difficult to distinguish between singularly political dynamics which prompt mass protests as opposed to those with social or economic roots. Nevertheless, there are a number of explicitly political developments which are by themselves sufficient causes for widespread political mobilization. In fact, they are for the most part the same set of dynamics which bring about crises of legitimacy for incumbent elites and nullify their justifications for a continued hold on power. The same factors that lead to a regime's growing political weakness have the potential of bringing about mass mobilization. They include, among others, growing demands for greater political participation, increasing awareness of nationalist sentiments, and the widespread acceptance of ideologies other than that of the regime. There is, none the less, a fine and subtle difference between legitimacy crisis as such and politically-induced mass mobilization. Legitimacy crisis is one of the conditions through which states are weakened and are pushed to the verge of collapse. It is only then, well after a permissive political environment has appeared, that the same

set of factors that had led to legitimacy crisis result in mass-based revolutionary mobilization.

A full examination of the grievances that provide the main impetus for mass mobilization is important not only in acquiring a more accurate picture of the causes of revolution but also in understanding the dynamics which result in the emergence of specific revolutionary leaders and their particular followers. The depth and preponderance of one particular form of grievance throughout society can by itself determine the composition of the revolution's leaders and their followers. More than anything else, the leaders and followers of a revolutionary movement are determined by the virtue of their relationship to the various sources of grievance that exist throughout society. Those who can most aptly discern the sources that aggrieve people, are ideologically and organizationally capable of exploiting this aggrievement, and offer either precise remedies or vague promises for their alleviation, rapidly ascend to leadership. At the same time, those masses who are most acutely afflicted with a certain form of actual or perceived misfortune, are organizationally and situationally most accessible to groups promising to alleviate those very misfortunes, and are emotionally and valuably receptive to the appeals and cries of revolutionary leaders form the bulk of mobilized protestors. In short, the very dynamics which set revolution into motion to a great extent determine the character and nature of their leaders and followers.

It is precisely for this reason that the overwhelming participants of revolutions are made up of displaced and dispossessed peasants, disillusioned and unassimilated rural migrants, and the aspiring but frustrated segments of the middle classes. Given the right political circumstances, increased inequality and bifurcation due to growing scarcity or skewed commercialization can promote an appropriate environment within which peasants become politically active and mobilized. The discovery by self-proclaimed revolutionaries of the merits of peasant-based revolutions, derived either from practical realism or from doctrinal idealism, provides a nexus between the two groups that has been a recurrent feature of many contemporary Third World revolutions. The less-than-successful peasant-based revolutionary movements that flourish throughout Latin America at frequent pace attest to the centrality of the

peasants-revolutionaries bond in causing considerable political havoc, if not necessarily outright revolution. The successful revolutions which occurred in China, Cuba, Vietnam, and to some extent in Nicaragua all did, none the less, entail considerable peasant participation.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, the cultural disillusionment, economic frustration, and political alienation of ever-growing proletariats turn them into readily-mobilizable foot-soldiers for various revolutionary causes, the full meanings of which they may not necessarily grasp or even endorse. Their participation in revolutionary movements is not so much a result of deep understanding of and adherence to specific revolutionary ideals but more a result of their readiness and availability, both emotionally and organizationally, to partake in politically oppositional activities. Those who do hold revolutionary hopes and aspirations and who do not hesitate to voice them are mostly drawn from among the ranks of the middle classes. By virtue of their social and economic positions, their education and background, and their political aspirations, the middle classes are much better positioned to assume the leadership mantle of a revolutionary movement, and when revolutions do occur, it is indeed the middle classes who are frequently in the forefront and are their most vociferous leaders. The politics of exactly what groups become mobilized and by whom are in turn determined by the prevailing social and cultural dynamics that bond the various social strata together.

CONCLUSION

Revolutions are clearly multifaceted phenomenon arising out of the interplay of an array of diverse political, economic, and social developments. They are, in the first place, products of skewed political development, of inherently unstable processes in which the body politic passes through, voluntarily or involuntarily, on its way toward becoming a modern polity. Revolutions are, in essence, violent struggles aimed at achieving a fuller and more developed political establishment that is supposedly more capable of delivering popularly desired goods and services than those which the present regime can offer. This struggle is in fact an eminently political one, with its genesis,

direction, and scope and magnitude all dependent on the specific political configurations that happen to prevail at the time. However, the contextual environment within which the willful leaders and the receptive audience of this struggle emerge is heavily influenced by dynamics which may be fundamentally apolitical, particularly those that are social and cultural or economic in nature. The polarizing affects of this contextual environment are all the more accented in praetorian and contemporary Third World societies, where industrial development, rapid urbanization, and intense social change simultaneously take place at dizzying pace and breed an atmosphere that is highly conducive to the eruption of full-blown revolutions, or at least to the appearance of revolutionary movements.

The next chapter examines in detail the characteristic of post-revolutionary systems. Suffice it to say here that where revolutions lead is a question largely dependent on whether they are more planned in genesis and execution or involve greater spontaneity. Planned and spontaneous revolutions result in vastly different types of post-revolutionary systems, the latter based on previously formulated programs but the former being formed as the movement progresses. Each type of regime—more specifically, its emergent leaders and its institutions—evolves out of different sets of dynamics. Yet despite such dramatic differences in the *manner* of evolution and pattern of institutionalization, all post-revolutionary regimes have one common fundamental quality: all rely on and indeed thrive through the inclusion of the masses into the body politic.¹⁴⁶

As mass-based movements from within society aimed at capturing political power, revolutions cannot evolve and succeed in inclusionary, populist regimes. As the next chapter demonstrates, opposition to post-revolutionary regimes can prove to be potentially far more costly, in human life if in nothing else, than that against regimes which are themselves product of a revolutionary experience. Nevertheless, political success in a revolution does not necessarily entail political stability. So long as normative means of political competition are absent, the tendency toward violence and revolution remain an endemic probability. Whether the new wave of emerging democracies in the Third World prove capable of stemming the tide of

engendered instability remains to be seen. What is certain is the enduring likelihood of further revolutionary eruptions in narrowly-based, delegitimized regimes promoting rapid social change and industrial development in the face of non-responsive and unchangeable political structures.

Notes

1. For an examination of the concept of revolution, see James Farr, "Historical Concepts in Political Science: The Case of 'Revolution,'" *American Journal of Political Science* vol. 26, no. 4 (November 1982), pp. 688-708, and John Dunn, "Revolution," in T. Ball, J. Farr, and R. Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

2. John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon*, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xvi.

3. Ibid.

4. Peter Calvert, *Politics, Power, and Revolution: An Introduction to Comparative Politics* (London: Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 163.

5. See, for example, Laszlo Bruszt, "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary," *Social Research* vol. 51, no. 2 (Summer 1990), pp. 365-87.

6. Ibid, p. 386.

7. Mehran Kamrava, "Causes and Leaders of Revolutions," *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies* vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 1990), p. 84.

8. A few examples of works on revolutions include: Michael Freeman, "Review Article: Theories of Revolution," *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 2, pp. 339-59; Rod Aya, "Theories of Revolution: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence," *Theory and Society* vol. 8, no. 1 (July 1979), pp. 39-99; Perez Zagorin, "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," *Political Science Quarterly* vol. LXXXVIII, no. 1 (March 1973), pp. 23-52; Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), Chap. 1; Issac Kromnick, "Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship," *History and Theory* vol. XI, no. 1 (1972), pp. 22-63; J.M. Maravall, "Subjective Conditions and Revolutionary Conflicts: Some Remarks," *British Journal of Sociology* vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1976), pp. 21-34; L. Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics* vol. 18 (1966), pp. 159-76. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, "A Quantitative Comparative Approach to Latin American Revolutions," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* vol. 32, nos. 1-2 (1991), pp. 82-109; and Wilber Chafee, "The Political Economy of Revolution and Democracy: Toward a

Theory of Latin American Politics," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* vol. 43, no. 4 (October 1984), pp. 385-99. For works in the "dependency" school of thought, see David Kowalewski, "Periphery Revolutions in World-System Perspective, 1821-1985," *Comparative Political Studies* vol. 24, no. 1 (April 1991), pp. 76-99, and Terry Bosell and William Dixon, "Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross National Analysis," *American Sociological Review* vol. 55 (August 1990), pp. 540-59.

9. See, especially, Barbara Salert, *Revolutions and Revolutionaries*. (New York: Elsevier, 1976), and Aya, "Theories of Revolution: Contrasting Models of Collective Violence".

10. Farr, "Historical Concepts in Political Science," p. 706.

11. Ibid.

12. John Dunn, *Rethinking Modern Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 77.

13. Kamrava, "Causes and Leaders of Revolutions," p. 84.

14. The Third World is inundated with examples of movements which embrace foreign ideologies and import them with little alteration to fit local conditions. "Maoist" groups across the Middle East and Latin America, especially the Shining Path in Peru, are prime examples.

15. Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (London: Longman, 1983).

16. James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* vol. 27, no. 1 (February 1962), pp. 7-19. For a more updated elaboration of the same theme, though with greater emphasis on psychological factors, see James Davies, "Maslow and Theory of Political Development: Getting to Fundamentals," *Political Psychology* vol. 12, no. 3 (1991), pp. 389-420. See also, Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

17. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

18. Jerrold Green, "Counter Mobilization as a Revolutionary Form," *Comparative Politics* vol. 16, no. 2 (January 1984), pp. 153-69.

19. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.

20. Kamrava "Causes and Leaders of Revolutions," pp. 80-1.

21. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society* vol. 11, no. 3 (May 1982), pp. 265-83.

22. Diplomatic pressures and conditional relations with the United States were highly instrumental in the direction and success of revolutions in Iran and the Philippines, as were relations between the Soviet Union and those governments which fell to revolutions in eastern Europe in the late 1980s.

23. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 4-5.

24. Ibid, p. 168; for more on praetorian systems.
25. See Mehran Kamrava, *Politics and Society in the Third World* (London: Routledge, 1993), Chap. 4.
26. Edmond Keller, "Revolution and the Collapse of Traditional Monarchies: Ethiopia," Barry Schutz and Robert Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 87.
27. Lucian Pye, "Legitimacy Crisis," Lucian Pye, et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 153.
28. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, p. 65.
29. Pye, "Legitimacy Crisis," Pye, et al., *Crises and Sequences*, p. 138.
30. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 31.
31. Pye, "Legitimacy Crisis," Pye et al., *Crises and Sequences*, p. 141.
32. Barry Schultz and Robert Slater, "A Framework for Analysis," Schultz and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change in the Third World*, p. 5.
33. Pye, "Legitimacy Crisis," Pye et al., *Crises and Sequences*, p. 150.
34. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 275.
35. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1989), p. 498.
36. See Kamrava, *State and Society in the Third World*, Chap. 1.
37. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," pp. 498-9.
38. Ibid, p. 500.
39. See Kamrava. *State and Society in the Third World*, Chap. 1.
40. Barry Schultz and Robert Slater, "A Framework for Analysis," Schultz and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 7.
41. Barry Schultz and Robert Slater, "Patterns of Legitimacy and Future Revolutions in the Third World," Schultz and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 248.
42. See Kamrava. *Politics and Society in the Third World* Chap. 2.
43. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 286.
44. Schultz and Slater, "A Framework for Analysis," p. 5.
45. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," p. 17.
46. Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel?* pp. 121-2.
47. R. Ben Jones, *The French Revolution* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967), p. 16.
48. Richard Charques, *The Twilight of the Russian Empire* (Oxford:

- Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 204.
49. Pedro Perez Sarduy, "Culture and the Cuban Revolution," *The Black Scholar* vol. 20, nos. 5-6 (Winter 1989), p. 18.
50. Mehran Kamrava, *Revolution in Iran: Roots of Turmoil* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 68.
51. Bruszt, "1989: The Negotiated Revolution in Hungary," p. 386.
52. Jones, *The French Revolution*, p. 15.
53. Sarduy, "Culture and the Cuban Revolution," p. 19.
54. Kamrava, *Revolution in Iran*, p. 66.
55. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 17.
56. Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*, p. xxi.
57. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 31.
58. Ibid, p. 47.
59. See, especially, Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Chap. 4, and Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," pp. 498-9.
60. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 504.
61. Ibid, p. 496.
62. David Mason, "Indigenous Factors," Schultz and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 40.
63. Goodwin and Skocpol. "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 500.
64. Mason, "Indigenous Factors," Schultz and Slater eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 33.
65. Kamrava, "Causes and Leaders of Revolutions," pp. 83-4.
66. See Kamrava, *Revolution in Iran*, pp. 30-2 and 40-5; and Bruszt, "1989: The Negotiated Revolution In Hungary," pp. 381-2.
67. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 501.
68. Schultz and Slater, "Patterns of Legitimacy and Future Revolutions in the Third World," Schultz and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 248.
69. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 502.
70. Foltz, "External Causes," Schultz and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, pp. 54-9.
71. Gerard Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), p. 40.
72. Foltz, "External Causes," Schults and Slater, eds., *Revolution and Political Change*, p. 63.
73. See Bruce Miroff, *Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy* (New York: David McKay, 1976), especially pp. 110-

66. A more up-to-date discussion of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America can be found in Thomas Paterson, J.G. Clifford, and Kenneth Hagan, *American Foreign Policy: A History* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1991), pp. 588-90 and 627-32.

74. Quoted in Clifford Krauss, "Revolution in Central America?" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 65, no. 3 (1987), p. 564.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 564-5.

76. Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Policy*, p. 588.

77. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 34.

78. See Kamrava, *State and Society in the Third World*, Chap. 1.

79. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 37.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

83. Irma Adelman and Jarius Hihn, "Crisis Politics in Developing Countries," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* vol. 33, no. 1 (October 1984), p. 20.

84. Elbaki Hermassi, *The Third World Reassessed* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 59-60.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

86. See Kamrava, *State and Society in the Third World*, Chap. 1.

87. For a discussion of "corporatism" see, Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Politics and Government: An Introduction* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987), pp. 134-7. See also above, Chap. 1.

88. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 500.

89. Dunn, *Rethinking Modern Political Theory*, p. 77.

90. Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*, p. 236.

91. In *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel Huntington classifies revolutions into "Eastern" and "Western" ones (p. 266).

92. Planned revolutions correspond closely to the variety Robert Dix calls "Latin American." Such revolutions occur, he writes, "in regimes that have been narrow, modernizing, military-based dictatorships rather than, say, weak monarchies. They have not simply collapsed, almost of their own weight, as in the Western style of revolution. Instead, they have had to be overthrown and their supporting armed forces defeated or demoralized in combat with those bent on revolution." Robert Dix, "Varieties of Revolution," *Comparative Politics* vol. 15, no. 3 (April 1983), p. 283.

93. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 492.

94. Carlos Vilas, "Popular Insurgency and Social Revolution in

Central America," *Latin American Perspectives* vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 1988), p. 69.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

96. James Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," *Politics and Society* vol. 7, no. 3 (1977), p. 294.

97. Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" *Comparative Politics* vol. 14, no. 3 (April 1982), p. 364.

98. Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," p. 295.

99. Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, p. 48.

100. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-3.

101. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 290.

102. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 496.

103. Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, p. 35.

104. Stuart Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse Tung* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 253. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 236-64.

105. Scott, "Hegemony and the Peasantry," p. 289.

106. Eric Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 276.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 279. Also see Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?"

108. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 497.

109. Mason, "Indigenous Factors," p. 42.

110. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 493.

111. *Ibid.*

112. Jerrold Green, "Countermobilization as a Revolutionary Form," p. 147.

113. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-1.

114. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, p. 101.

115. This was precisely the case in the revolutions that occurred in France, Iran, and in Eastern Europe in the end of the 1980s. In the Russian revolution, however, the soviets played an important organizational role.

116. Chaliand, *Revolution in the Third World*, p. 40.

117. See Kamrava, *Revolution in Iran*, Chap. 5, esp. pp. 128-30; for Eastern Europe, see the special edition on Eastern European revolutions in *Social Research* vol. 57, no. 2 (Summer 1990).

118. Thomas Greene, *Contemporary Revolutionary Movements*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 57.

119. This was particularly the case in the Cuban and the Ethiopian revolutions, where the ideological orientations of post-revolutionary

political leaders did not fully become apparent until some time after their success.

120. Goodwin and Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," p. 494.

121. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 300-1.

122. Greene, *Contemporary Revolutionary Movements*, p. 63.

123. Mason, "Indigenous Factors," p. 48.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

125. Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Base of Obedience and Revolt* (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 459.

126. Calvert, *Politics, Power, and Revolution*, p. 168.

127. See Kamrava, *State and Society in the Third World*, Chap. 2.

128. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel?*, pp. 121-2.

129. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," p. 8.

130. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel?*, p. 46. For a full analysis of relative deprivation see *ibid.*, pp. 46-56.

131. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

133. Manus Midlarsky, "Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence," *American Political Science Review* vol. 82, no. 2 (July 1988), p. 492.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 493.

135. See Jack Goldstone, "State Breakdown in the English Revolution: A New Synthesis," *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 92, no. 2 (September 1986), pp. 257-322.

136. *Ibid.*, pp. 310-11.

137. Manus Midlarsky, "Scarcity and Inequality: Prologue to the Onset of Mass Revolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* vol. 26, no. 1 (March 1982), p. 34.

138. Midlarsky, "Rulers and the Rule," pp. 493-4.

139. Jerome Himmelstein and Michael Kimmel, "Review Essay: States and Revolutions: The Implications and Limits of Skocpol's Structural Model," *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 86, no. 5 (March 1981), p. 1147. Also see Theda Skocpol. "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?"

140. Jeffrey Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*, (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 41.

141. Val Moghadam, "Industrial Development, Culture, and Working-Class Politics: A Case Study of Tabriz Industrial Workers in the Iranian Revolution," *International Sociology* vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1987), pp. 164-5.

142. Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, p. 62.

143. See Kamrava, *State and Society in the Third World*, Chap. 2.

144. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p. 290.

145. See Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*.

146. See below, pp. 73-4.